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COMMENTS
THE NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS: COMPOSITION,
CONSTITUTIONALITY, AND DESIRABILITY
i. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1971, Chief Justice of the United States Warren E. Burger,
acting as permanent Chairman of the Federal Judicial Center,1 appointed a
blue-ribbon Study Group2 to examine the Supreme Court's burgeoning case
load and to recommend possible methods of alleviating it.3 The Study Group's
report was made public approximately a year later, on December 19, 1972, 4
and it was clear that it called for nothing less than a widescale revamping of
the federal judiciary system.
In sum, the Report put forth two main independent proposals: 5
1. The Federal Judicial Center, created by act of Congress in 1967 (28 U.S.C. § 620
(1970)), was formulated to study the operation of United States courts and to make appro-
priate recommendations for the improvement of the admini tration and management thereof.
For the organization and the other functions of the Center, see U.S. Gov't Organization
Manual 1972/73, at 65-66 (rev'd ed.) 1972. For a general description, see P. Bator, P. Mishkin,
D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
63 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Hart & Wechsler).
2. The Study Group consisted of Chairman Paul A. Freund, Professor of Law at Harvard
Law School, constitutional law authority, author of several books on the Supreme Court,
and former law clerk to Associate Justice Louis Brandeis; Alexander M. Bickel, Professor
of Law at Yale Law School, author of several books on the Supreme Court, and former
law clerk to Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter; Peter D. Ehrenhaft, a member of the
bar, and former law clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren; Russell D. Nles, Professor of Law
at New York University School of Law, former dean of that school and Director of the
Institute of Judicial Administration; Bernard G. Segal, a member of the bar, and a mem-
ber of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States; Robert L. Stem, a member of the bar, and coauthor of R. Stern & E. Gress-
man, Supreme Court Practice (4th ed. 1969); and Charles A. Wright, Professor of Law at
the University of Texas School of Law and author of several works on the federal courts,
including Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts (2d ed. 1970). Federal Judicial Center,
Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court v-vi, and AlS-A17
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Report]. Important portions of the Report are excerpted in
59 A.BAJ. 139 (1973).
3. Report IX.
4. However, advance word of the Report's proposals had 'leaked out" in an article in
National Observer, Nov. 11, 1972, at 1, coL 1, which generally contains a good description
of the Report's proposals.
5. See Report, Summary of Recommendations, at 47-48. Similar proposals for a new
National Court of Appeals had previously been voiced by Carrington, Crowded Dockets and
the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82
Harv. L. Rev. 542, 612-17 (1969); and Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The
Changing Role of the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 841, 851-55 (1972). However,
these earlier proposals differ from that of the Study Group in several important details,
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1. the creation, by statute, of a new National Court of Appeals, to consist
of seven judges drawn on a rotating basis from the existing federal courts of
appeals, and with a two-fold function:
a) to screen all petitions for certiorari and appeals which now would be filed
in the Supreme Court, and to refer only the most "review-worthy" to that
Court for disposition; and
b) to retain for decision on the merits cases of conflict between the circuits
(except those considered most "review-worthy," which would be referred to
the Supreme Court, as above); and
2. the implementation of certain independent procedural and jurisdictional
reforms, including abolition of statutory three-judge federal district courts (and,
hence, direct review of their decisions by the Supreme Court); elimination of
certain other types of direct appeals to the Supreme Court from district courts;
substitution of certiorari for appeal in all cases to be considered by the Supreme
Court; and establishment of a non-judicial body to investigate criminal com-
plaints.
We will here consider only the first of these two proposals, namely, the crea-
tion of a new National Court of Appeals; it is this proposal that has stirred up
the most controversy, 6 and it is this proposal that is the most sweeping and
unprecedented. 7
A. Statistical Rationale
It is difficult to fault the conclusion of the Study Group that "[t]he statistics
of the Court's current workload, both in absolute terms and in the mounting
trend, are impressive evidence that the conditions essential for the performance
of the Court's mission do not exist." A brief consideration of those statistics
may illuminate the magnitude of the problem. Three times as many cases were
filed in the Court's 1971 Term than in the 1951 Term. Similarly, the backlog,
or carryover (from one term to the next), has doubled in the last ten years. 10
The group of cases that has shown the most precipitous increase in number has
been the in forma pauperis cases, which have increased over one thousand per-
cent in the last three decades." Thus, one recent commentator has calculated
and thus can be thought of as predecessors of the Study Group Report only in the
broadest sense.
6. See notes 75-87 infra and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the other procedural and jurisdictional proposals, see Report 25-46.
8. Id. at 5. However, some authorities view the Court's current caseload with con-
siderably less alarm; to them, the number of cases presented to the Court is not presently
so great as to warrant radical reorganization of the judiciary. See notes 87, 163-66 infra
and accompanying text.
9. 3,643 cases in 1971, as opposed to 1,234 in 1951. Report 2, and Table II, at A2. By con-
trast, the growth in the Court's caseload between 1935 and 1951 was much more gradual
(from 983 cases in 1935, to 1,234 in 1951), thus indicating the dramatic and disturbing
recent rise in the Court's workload. Id.
10. From 428 in 1961 to 864 in 1971. Report 2, and Table I, at Al.
11. From 178 cases in 1941, to 1,930 in 1971. Report 2. For one possible factor con-
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that, since each individual Justice considers each case before the Court,12 he
must "decide" twelve decisions per working day.13 However, since decisions
increasingly consist of summary disposition, the number of cases actually
argued and decided by opinion has not increased appreciably, "despite the rising
flood of petitions and appeals." 14
The Study Group cited several factors which contributed to the increased
size of the Supreme Court calendar; an examination of these factors makes it
clear that they themselves will probably continue to grow in magnitude in the
forseeable future. Chief among them are general population growth and con-
comitant economic expansion; 1' extension of and expansion in the fields covered
by legislation, e.g., civil rights, environmental protection, safety, consumer,
"and other social and economic legislation;' 10 the providing of free legal
counsel to indigents who could otherwise not afford litigation;' 7 changes in
constitutional doctrine (e.g., reapportionment, school desegregation and criminal
law), which require the high Court's clarification; 18 the sheer expansion in the
membership of the bar itself;' 9 and the possibility of an increase in the number
of federal judicial circuits 20 As the Report stated, the existence and continua-
tion of such factors imply that "the prospects of a still further increase in the
number of review-worthy cases reaching the Court cannot be gainsaid."-'
The consequences of this staggering workload seem all too dear:
tributing to the increase of in forma pauperis petitions, see note 17 infra and accompan)ing
text.
12. R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 204-07, 230-32 (4th ed. 1969).
13. Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: the Significance of Limited
Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L. Rev. 373, 374 (1972). For addi-
tional statistics and commentary about the Court's workload in the recent past, see also
Hart & Wechsler 56-59; Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 Cornell L.Q.
401 (1960); Gressman, Much Ado About Certiorari, 52 Geo. L.J. 742 (1964); Harlan,
Manning the Dikes, 13 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 541 (1958); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958
Term, Foreword: The TIme Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1959).
14. Report 5. The term which saw the most number of cases decided by opinion was
1944; by contrast, the 1970 Court decided 137 cases by opinion, and the 1971 Court 140.
Id. and Table IV, at A7.
15. Report 3.
16. Id. The Report states elsewhere: "There has been a proliferation of federal regu-
latory and welfare legislation in recent years, legislation that requires interpretation, that
produces conflicting judicial decisions, and that frequently raises constitutional problems." Id.
at 6.
17. Id. at 3. The Report notes that such cases as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 353
(1963), which mandated appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants, and Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), noted in 41 Fordham L. Rev. 722 (1973), which ex-
tended Gideon to misdemeanants who faced imprisonment, have led to a "tremendous" rise
in the number of in forma pauperis cases with which the Supreme Court must deal.
18. Report 3.




For an ordinary appellate court the burgeoning volume of cases would be a staggering
burden; for the Supreme Court the pressures of the docket are incompatible with the
appropriate fulfillment of its historic and essential functions.
Over the past thirty-five years, as has been seen, the number of cases filed has
grown about fourfold, while the number of cases in which the Court has heard oral
argument before decision has remained substantially constant. Two consequences can
be inferred. Issues that would have been decided on the merits a generation ago are
passed over by the Court today; and second, the consideration given to the cases
actually decided on the merits is compromised by the pressures of "processing" the
inflated docket of petitions and appeals. 22
B. Alternative Solutions
In considering proposals to alleviate the Court's workload, the Study Group
examined and rejected several other possible solutions. An increase in the
Court's membership was felt to be "counter-productive," since it would only
mean that there were more Justices to hear and consider the same number of
cases; 28 it would also upset the tradition of the nine-member Court. Similarly,
division of the Court into panels was deemed unacceptable for a number of
reasons: it could run afoul of the Constitution's requirement of "one supreme
Court,124 it would decrease the authority of the Court, and it would expose
Court decisions to the lottery-like, chance composition of the panels.25 Limiting
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to cases presenting constitutional issues would
be unworkable since constitutional issues are often inseparably intertwined
with other issues, "making awkward and artificial their separation in advance
of decision;"126 further, a Court restricted to constitutional issues would never
be able to hear important questions of federal administrative authority, judicial
procedure, and the like.27 Categorical exclusion of certain classes of cases from
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction would likewise prove to be an unwise restric-
tion, since "[i]t would be difficult to say of any class of litigation that there
22. Id. at 5-6.
23. Id. at 7. Similar objections to an increase in membership were voiced by then
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes in a letter to Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D.-Mont.),
in S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 40 (1937), reproduced in Hart & Wechsler
43-44 n.58. Justices Brandeis and Van Devanter approved the letter. S. Rep. No. 711 at 40, In
Hart & Wechsler at 44 n.58.
24. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 1; see notes 156-62 infra and accompanying text.
25. Report 7-8. The Report notes that "[tihis element of a lottery, inescapable in the
circuits and incongruous enough for litigants and counsel in particular cases, is incom-
patible with the responsibility of the Supreme Court to the law itself." Id. at 8.
26. Id. at 10.
27. Id. The Report concludes: "Flexibility and resourcefulness in determining appro-
priate grounds of decision would be sacrificed [by a constitutional Court]. Time and
energy would be expended in an effort to draw jurisdictional lines between categories of
cases that in fact have a double, rather than a distinct, aspect. Counsel and perhaps Justices
themselves would tend to inflate legal questions to constitutional dimensions in justification
of the jurisdiction of the Court. All in all, we believe that a limitation resting on a
criterion of 'constitutional' cases would be mistaken in conception and unhealthy In Its
consequences." Id.
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could never be a case within it important enough for Supreme Court review."
Specialized tribunals to hear cases in certain areas of administrative law (e.g.,
tax or labor law) also run the risk of losing judicial perspective, -9 and in any
case would not do much to reduce the volume of petitions confronting the
Supreme Court.3 0 Abandoning the "Rule of Four," which now permits the vote
of only four Justices to bring a certiorari case before the full Court, and re-
placing it with some sort of majority vote (i.e., to require five, or even six,
Justices to vote for the granting of certiorari), would sacrifice the important
principle that a minority of the Court's membership can at least require the
whole Court to consider a case;3 1 in any event, a deviation from the "Rule of
Four" would not relieve the Court's major burden of screening all the applica-
tions for review, and might even slow down the process of certiorari selection,
since greater care would presumably be exercised to determine which cases would
be selected for a smaller appellate docket.32 Lastly, prolonging the annual
term, and reducing (or even eliminating) oral argument were considered un-
necessary and undesirable,33 although certain modifications of these processes
may be worthy of consideration.3 4
C. Previous Attempts to Lessen the Burden on the Supreme Court
In discussing various alternative proposals to reduce the Court's workload, it
may be helpful to add a note of historical perspective, for this is not the first
time that the Court has been faced with monumental administrative problems
because of voluminous caseloads. In the past, it is possible to discern at least
three occasions on which far-reaching remedial reforms were enacted specifically
to relieve the Court's burden.35
1. The Evarts Act of 1891
The Evarts Act36 created the federal circuit courts of appeals in order to
relieve the Supreme Court of a hopeless backlog by interposing another layer
28. Id. at 10-11.
29. Id. at 11. However, others have proposed such specialized courts. E.g., Friendly, A
Federal Court of Administrative Appeals?, 74 Case & Cora. 23 (Mar.-Apr. 1969); Griswold,
The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1944).
30. Report 12.
31. Id. at 39-40.
32. Id. at 40.
33. Id. at 40-43.
34. E.g., eliminating the seemingly wasteful practice of setting down undecided cases
for reargument at the next term (id. at 41-42); reorganizing the Supreme Court bar, to im-
prove the quality of oral argument before the Court (id. at 42-43).
35. See generally Hart & Wechsler 32-41, 1539-45; C. Wright, Federal Courts 1-6, 471
(2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Wright].
36. Act of far. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. The Act is also sometimes referred to as
the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891. See generally Hart & Wechsler 40-41, 1539-41;
Wright 5-6, 471; Maris, The Federal Judicial System, 12 Modem Federal Practice Digest
815, 817 (West 1970) [hereinafter cited as Mars]; Report 8.
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of review between the high Court and trial courts. 7 Under the act, however,
the Supreme Court was still obliged to exercise direct review from trial courts
in many types of cases.3s The act did alleviate the Court's workload to a cer-
tain extent, but only in the short run.39
2. The Judicial Code of 1911
The Judicial Code of 191140 enlarged the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of
appeals by providing that certain cases, formerly appealable directly to the
Supreme Court, would first go to the court of appeals. 41 The act also abolished
the old circuit courts, 42 which had become superfluous given the existence of
the courts of appeals. 43 Again, the effect was to reduce the number of cases
reaching the high Court, by providing for increased review and disposition in
lower federal courts.
3. The Judges' Bill of 1925
The Judges' Bill, 44 conceived and drafted by a committee of Supreme Court
Justices,45 was an attempt to reduce the Court's burden by greatly decreasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, and substituting the discretionary
method of certiorari as the primary procedure for seeking review.40 "The effect
of the passage of this act was to give to the Supreme Court the right of control
over its docket, so that it could decline to hear appeals except in cases of public
importance or involving important questions of law or statutory construction,
or cases involving a conflict of decision by lower courts." 47 Also, direct appeals
to the Supreme Court from district courts were further restricted.48
37. Marls 817. "A back log of approximately twelve hundred cases had accumulated [in
the Supreme Court] and there was an interval of approximately four years between the
docketing of cases and their decision." Id.
38. See id.
39. "At the 1890 Term 623 new cases were filed. With the benefit of the Act of 1891,
the number dropped sharply in the 1892 Term to 275. But a steady rise again set in as the
volume of litigation rose in the lower courts. Thirty years later, at the 1923 Term, there
were almost 750 new filings ... ." Report 8.
40. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 23, 36 Stat. 1087. See generally Wright 6, 471; Mars 818.
41. See Marls 818.
42. Established in 1789 by the First Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch,. 20,
1 Stat. 73. For a discussion of that act generally, see Wright 3-4.
43. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
44. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. See generally F. Frankfurter & J. Landis,
The Business of the Supreme Court, A Study in the Federal Judicial System 255-94 (1927);
Hart & Wechsler 41, 1541-42; Burton, Judging Is Also Administration, 21 Temp. L.Q. 77,
83-86 (1947); Maris 817; Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The Sig-
nificance of Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L. Rev. 373, 374
(1972); Report 8.
45. Hart & Wechsler 41.
46. Id.; Maris 816-17; Report 8.
47. Maris 817.
48. Hart & Wechsler 41, 1542. The Study Group's proposals included the elimination of
what direct-appeal situations remain. See Report 26-34.
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The act had the effect of allowing the Court to control virtually its entire
docket, by means of certiorari review.49 Unfortunately, however, in the course
of time these older solutions have become part of the current problem. "The
Courts of Appeals have [themselves] encountered a dramatic rise in their own
business, with a proportionate outflow to the Supreme Court; and the task of
coping with the discretionary jurisdiction on certiorari overhangs all of the
Court's work."50 Further remedial measures are thus called for, and it is to the
most radical of the proposals to which we now turn.
II. THE NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS5'
A. Powers5 2 and Composition
The National Court of Appeals, as proposed, would have two basic func-
tions:53 to screen all petitions for review now filed in the Supreme Court; and
to decide on the merits most cases presenting conflicts between the federal
circuits." Procedurally, as regards the court's review of petitions, the national
court would merely "substitute" for the Supreme Court; thus, all cases now
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, excepting those which fall under
the Court's original jurisdiction,5 would be filed initially in the national
court, in papers similar to those now filed directly in the Supreme Court.L5
The national court would have the power to deny review, 7 and such denial
would be final in that there then would be no access left to the Supreme
Court. 58 If, however, the national court considered a case "review-worthy," it
49. As the Study Group notes, certiorari now provides the jurisdictional basis for over
907 of the cases docketed with the Court. Report 4, Table VII-a, at All.
50. Report 8-9.
51. For general discussions of the proposed new court, see US. News & World Rep, Jan.
1, 1973, at 29; N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1973, § 4, at 6, col. 1; N.Y.L.J., Dec. 20, 1972, at 1, col.
3; Nat'l Observer, Nov. 11, 1972, at 1, col. 1; Report 18-24.
52. Constitutionally, there is little doubt that Congress has great control over the jur-
isdiction and powers of the lower federal courts. E.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182
(1943); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,
260 US. 226 (1922) ; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 453 (1850) ; W.F. Cary v. S.T. Curtis,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 265 (1845); Westark Prod. Credit As'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co, 100 F.
Supp. 52 (WI). Ark. 1951). See generally Wright 23-26. However, this is not to say that the
national court itself is necessarily constitutional. See notes 89-162 infra and accompanying
text for a discussion of the proposed court's constitutionality.
53. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
54. Report 18.
55. As defined in U.S. Const. art. M, § 2, cl. 2, ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme
Court shall have Jurisdiction.'), and by 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970).
56. Report 20.
57. Such discretionary denial of review by the national court could be governed by the
considerations now embodied in Rule 19(1) (1954) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
Alternatively, the national court could make its own rules for review, subject, of course,
to the supervening rule-making power of the Supreme Court. Report 20-21.
58. Report 21.
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would be certified to the Supreme Court for further screening. D Once the
Supreme Court had received a case in this fashion, it would have its current power
to grant or deny review, to reverse or affirm without argument, or to hear the
case and decide with written opinion.10 The Study Group cautioned that, in
cases of doubt, the national court should certify the case to the Supreme Court
rather than deny review,61 although it is expected that the "great majority" of
petitions received by the national court would be denied by it.02
The national court, as proposed, would also have the power to hear and
decide on the merits those cases where federal courts of appeals have rendered
conflicting decisions.6 Such decisions by the national court would be final and
would not be reviewable by the Supreme Court.0 However, if the national
court considered a conflict case of sufficient importance, it could certify it
directly to the Supreme Court.65 The Supreme Court would then dispose of
the case on its own, 6 or, alternatively, remand it td the national court for
hearing and adjudication. 7
Despite the national court's significant power to deny Supreme Court review
to cases deemed unworthy, the Supreme Court would retain certain powers of
its own. For example, the high Court would still be able to grant certiorari
before judgment in any court of appeals, 8 or before denial of review or judg-
ment by the national court. 9 Also, the Supreme Court would retain the power
to make the rules governing the national court and its practices, for matters
that now would fall under the scope of the Supreme Court rules.7 '
59. Report 18. Probably "[sleveral hundred" cases would be certified annually to the
Supreme Court in this manner. Id.
60. Id. at 22.
61. Id. at 21.
62. Id. at 18.
63. Id. at 21.
64. Id. The Study Group also noted parenthetically that this function of the national
court-i.e., to resolve intra-circuit conflicts-could also be applied to conflicts between
panels of the circuits, thus avoiding the "increasing problems of en banc hearings by the
courts of appeals." Id. n.3 (emphasis omitted).
65. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
67. Report 22. "This would be the disposition indicated in a case in which the Supreme
Court agreed that the conflict was a true one, but did not view the issue involved as being
of sufficient comparative importance to warrant a hearing in that Court." Id.
68. The Court also has this power at present. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1970).
69. Report 21. However, this is not a procedure "to be encouraged" (id. at 23), and
"[t]he expectation would be that exercises of this power would be exceptional" (id. at 21),
even as the Court's use of its current power to grant certiorari before judgment in a court
of appeals has been deemed an extraordinary remedy. American Constr. Co. v. Jackson-
ville, T. & K.W. Ry., 148 U.S. 372, 384 (1893). However, it has been a remedy not In-
frequently used. Wright 477 n.7 collects cases. See also editorial, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1973,
at 20, col. 1, which suggests that, "as a practical matter," the Supreme Court would prob-
ably seldom bypass the national court in selecting petitions it wanted to hear, even If It had
the power to do so. See also note 157 infra and accompanying text.
70. Report 22.
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The proposed composition of the national court seems designed to allay any
fears of "court-packing" with judges of only one ideological stripe. The new
court would choose its seven judges from the existing members of the federal
courts of appeals. 7' Assignment to the national court would be made for three-
year staggered terms, with appointments alternating between the most senior
and the most junior circuit judges.7 2 In addition, no two judges from the same
circuit would serve on the national court at the same time, and no judge who
had served once would be appointed again until all other eligible judges had
served 3
Thus the opportunity to serve on the National Court of Appeals would be made
available to many circuit judges, the Court would draw on a wide range of talents and
varied experience while not losing its identity and continuity as a court, and the burden
of any personal inconvenience would not fall too heavily on any small group of judges.
Appointments should ... provide the court with the widest diversity of experience,
outlook and age, in order to help secure for it the confidence of the profession, of the
Supreme Court, and of the country.74
B. Criticism
Notwithstanding the above, criticism of the proposed national court has
been heavy and widespread. To begin with, there are those who contend that
the national court would be unconstitutional. Retired Chief Justice Earl Warren
has reportedly written a memo to all his former clerks, emphatically stating his
opposition to the proposed national court on constitutiqnal grounds." Similarly,
former Associate Justice Arthur Goldberg, noting that the Constitution speaks
of "one supreme Court,"7 6 declared that it might be unconstitutional to delegate
to "'another court the responsibilities of determining which cases the Supreme
Court should hear.' "17 Others have voiced the fear that a national court, if
not actually unconstitutional, would at least destroy the Supreme Court as an
institution; would undermine the functions and stature of the high Court; and
would lessen confidence in the Supreme Court and the judiciary in general. 78
71. With some exceptions: "All judges serving as chief judges [of courts of appeals], or
who would have succeeded to a chief judgeship during their term of service on the National
Court of Appeals had they been selected, and all judges with less than five years' service
as United States circuit judges" would not be considered for appointment to the national




75. Nat'l Observer, Dec. 16, 1972, at 4, col. 4.
76. U.S. Coast. art. III, § 1, ci. 1.
77. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1973, § 4, at 6, col 1. Mr. Justice Goldberg's criticism of the
national court is set out more fully in his article One Supreme Court, The New Republic,
Feb. 10, 1973, at 14. The question of the national court's constitutionality will be dis-
cussed in detail at notes 89-162 infra and accompanying text.
78. E.g., the remarks of former Chief justice Earl Warren in Nat'l Observer, Dec. 16,
1972, at 4, col 4. judge Henry Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has also indicated a lack of confidence among the judiciary for the national
1973]
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Another argument is that the Supreme Court's most important work lies in
determining which cases to hear. Associate Justice William 0. Douglas used a
recent dissenting opinion to say:
The load of work so far as processing cases is concerned has increased. That work is
important; and in many ways it is the most important work we do. For the selection
of cases across the broad spectrum of issues presented is the very heart of the judicial
process. . . .Across the screen each Term come the worries and concerns of the
American people-high and low-presented in concrete, tangible form.70
Or to put it another way, there is no reason to think that the national court
would necessarily send to the Supreme Court those cases which the latter Court
would most like to hear, especially where the matter of law involved is seem-
ingly settled. Thus, the high Court might not be given the opportunity to recon-
sider and (perhaps) overrule some of its earlier decisions.8 0
Others argue that the national court would deny Americans the "right" to
bring their cases to the highest Court 81-although it may be difficult to find
court: "'Not every circuit judge now regards each member of the Supreme Court as his
intellectual superior, but all of us have a respect and reverence for the Court as an Insti-
tution that we could never entertain for a body like the proposed national court.'" N.Y.
Times, Jan. 7, 1973, § 4, at 6, col. 2.
79. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 175 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In a similar vein, one commentator has noted that "[mjany of what the late Justice John
Harlan called 'peewee cases' turned out in time to be landmark decisions." Nat'l Observer,
Nov. 11, 1972, at 1, 14, col. 5'
80. Mr. Justice Goldberg said: "[Olne cannot be certain that the views of a rotating
group of appellate court judges about which cases are important will resemble those . . .of
the Supreme Court justices. Courts of appeal are bound by Supreme Court precedents. If
these are to be overruled, only the Supreme Court is authorized to do so.
. ..[Alt the 1972 term, the Supreme Court itself, reversing prior decisions, held that the
death penalty as applied was unconstitutional. Would Furman v. Georgia [408 U.S. 238
(1972), noted in 41 Fordham L. Rev. 671 (1973)] have reached the Supreme Court under the
screening plan by appellate judges proposed in the study group report? Would Brown v.
Board of Education [347 U.S. 483 (1954)1? Would a national court of appeals have known
that the Supreme Court was prepared to overrule Betts v. Brady [316 U.S. 455 (1942)] and
hold that impoverished criminal defendants must be given lawyers, or might it have dismissed
the case of Gideon v. Wainwright [372 U.S. 335 (1963)] before it reached the Supreme Court?
...Would a national court of appeals have guessed properly that in Baker v. Carr [369
U.S. 186 (1962)] the Supreme Court was prepared first to reconsider and then to over-
rule prior recent decisions holding reapportionment to be a 'political' rather than justiciable
issue?
... True, in some of these cases the Supreme Court had given some indications of possible
reconsideration of its prior decisions. But would the signals be clear enough for appellate
judges trained to respect precedents?" Goldberg, One Supreme Court, supra note 77, at 15-16.
See also Westen, Threat to the Supreme Court, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Feb. 22, 1973, at 29, 31-32.
However, the Supreme Court would still retain the power to "reach down" for any case
it wanted to hear, prior to denial of review by the national court; see notes 68-69 supra
and accompanying text. This power should enable the Court to rehear seemingly settled
cases as it desires to do so, at least in theory; cf. note 157 infra and accompanying text.
81. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1973, § 4, at 6, col. 1.
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authority for the existence of such a "right."8 2 There is also the worry that the
national court is a mere political device designed to prevent the Supreme Court
from enforcing constitutional rights,s3 or to conceal the inequities present in
the criminal justice system 84 Alternatively, depending on one's political point
of view, the increased business of the Supreme Court can supposedly be traced
back to the "activists" of the Warren Court, whose "unnecessary" decisions
gave rise to all the increased workload the high Court now faces; therefore,
instead of a new "judicial layer," it is only necessary to "halt the meddling in
non-judicial affairs."'s5
There may also be a "Parkinson's Law" aspect to the creation of a new
National Court of Appeals: the caseload may itself increase to match the addi-
tional capacity for handling appeals.86 In spite of the statistical evidence to the
contrary, there are those who contend that, in fact, the Supreme Court is not
now overworked, and therefore any extreme remedies like a National Court of
Appeals are unnecessary at this time.8 7 Lastly, there has been no dearth of al-
ternative proposals.88
C. Contitutionality
By far the most serious criticism directed at the proposed national court has
concerned its possible lack of constitutionality. It is best to approach the ques-
tion of constitutionality from both a specific and a general point of view, al-
82. See notes 89-94 infra and accompanying text.
83. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1973, § 4, at 6, col. 2 (Sources reporting remarks of former Chief
Justice Warren).
84. Remarks of Chief Judge David Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. Id.
85. Editorial, N.Y. Daily News, Dec. 22, 1972, at 39, coL 1.
86. Editorial, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1973, at 20, coL 1 ("Lawyers might become more in-
clined to try for a reversal if they felt they might find a few sympathetic ears at a higher
leveL"). Note that this "Parkinson's Law" syndrome did eventually engulf earlier attempts to
reduce the Supreme Court's workload. See notes 35-50 supra and accompanying text.
87. E.g., the remarks of Mr. Justice Douglas in Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409
U.S. 151 (1972) ("The case for our 'overwork' is a myth. The total number of cases filed
has increased .... But we grant certiorari or note probable jurisdiction in very few cases.
[.. n terms of petitions for certiorari granted and appeals noted and set for argument our
load today is substantially what it was 33 years ago.
... We are, if anything, underworked, not overworked." Id. at 174-76 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting)). Similarly, Associate Justice Potter Stewart has remarked that "'[tlhe very heavy
caseload is neither intolerable nor impossible to handle.'" N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1973, § 4, at 6,
col. 2. There is also the theory that most complaints about the Supreme Court's caseload come
from newly appointed Justices, who initially find the task overwhelming but learn to deal
with it as they become more experienced. Id.
88. E.g., to provide "less imaginative solutions" like better staffing for the Court.
Editorial, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1973, at 20, col 2. Or to create a new office to write memo-
randa for cases brought by indigent defendants. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1973, § 4, at 6, col.
2. This latter proposal is similar to the Study Group's recommendation of a non-judicial
federal body to investigate and assess prisoner complaints involving the denial of consti-
tutional rights. Report 14.
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though the two are to some extent intertwined. Specifically, is there any such
thing as a "right" to appeal to the Supreme Court, or, indeed, to any higher
court? And, generally, how much control can Congress, by its statutes (like the
one proposed to establish the national court) constitutionally exercise over the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
To take the questions in the order they are presented, it seems indeed that
there has evolved a popular myth that any wronged American has the right to
take his case to the Supreme Court. As one commentator has noted: "When
someone has been sufficiently aroused to assert his legal rights to the utmost,
he may exclaim with conviction, 'I'll fight this all the way to the Supreme
Court.' The Supreme Court is the symbol for vindication of rights and protec-
tion against arbitrary governmental action."80 Unfortunately, as even that
same commentator pointed out, there is no real or protected right to appeal to
the Supreme Court in any case.90 Nor can failure to provide for an appeal be
considered a denial of due processY1 The absence of a right to appeal goes back
to the very first days of the Supreme Court, where it was said:
But, surely, it cannot be deemed a denial of justice, that a man shall not be permitted
to try his cause two or three times over. If he has one opportunity for the trial of
all the parts of his case, justice is satisfied; and even if the decision of the circuit
court had been made final, no denial of justice could be imputed to our govern-
ment .... 92
Over the years, the Court has consistently deferred to Congress in the deter-
89. Note, Limitations on the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 20 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 99 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Limitations on Jurisdiction].
90. Id. at 113. This is true for both civil and criminal cases. As an example of the
former, the commentator chose Ex parte Pennsylvania, 109 U.S. 174 (1883) (a case dealing
with the legality of a compulsory pilotage law), wherein the Court stated: "Congress alone
has the power to determine whether the judgment of a court of the United States, of
competent jurisdiction, shall be reviewed or not. If it fails to provide for such a review, the
judgment stands as the judgment of the court of last resort, and settles finally the rights
of the parties which are involved." Id. at 176. For a criminal case, the commentator sug-
gested Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940), which said that "the right to a
judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of
justice . . . ." Id. at 325. Indeed, an examination of the history of criminal appeals to the
Supreme Court shows that such appeals were initially not provided for at all, and only
developed when Congress specifically authorized them. See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S.
310, 319 (1892).
91. Lenoir, Congressional Control Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 5 U. Kan. L. Rev. 16, 36 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Lenoir]; Limitations on Juris-
dictions 113. See, e.g., Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 533, 536 (1926) ; Reetz
v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903); Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 297 (1895);
Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 275 (1895); Pittsburgh, Cin., Chi., & St. L. Ry. v. Backus,
154 U.S. 421, 427 (1894); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894); Montana Co. v.
St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160, 171 (1894); The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381,
386 (1881) ; Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795, 798 (7th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 256 U.S.
689 (1921).
92. Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 329 (1796).
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mination of when, if at all, an appeal to the Supreme Court would lie. 3
Further, certain procedural barriers to appeal tend to negate the existence of
any "right" to appeal. 9V 4
Therefore, it appears certain that there is no such thing as a "right" to appeal
one's case to the Supreme Court. However, there remains the larger question of
whether and to what extent Congress can pass a statute that, by taking away
the Supreme Court's ability to screen its caseload and to determine its own
docket, in effect limits the appellate jurisdiction of that Court. Control of
appellate jurisdiction is a topic that has drawn the attention of many distin-
guished commentators over the years,a and it is worth renewed, in-depth
examination in the context of the proposed national court.
93. E.g., in United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106 (1848), the Court dismissed
an appeal because of lack of jurisdiction, since it had not been prosecuted within the time
limit set by act of Congress. The Court stated: "The power to hear and determine a case
like this is conferred upon the court by acts of Congress, and the same authority which
gives the jurisdiction has pointed out the manner in which the case shall be brought before
us; and we have no power to dispense with any of these provisions, nor to change or
modify them." Id. at 113.
Note the possible parallel to the national court, since the Court in Curry dcussed
Congress' sole power to determine "the manner in which the case shall be brought before
us." See notes 95-152 infra and accompanying text for a general discussion of congressional
control of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
94. For example, there are certain statutory time limits for seeking Supreme Court re-
view, on appeal or by granting of certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970) and Sup. CL R. 11,
22. See generally Hart & Wecbsle 1544-45, 1593; Wright 492-93. These time limitations are
generally considered to be jurisdictional. FTC v. Mneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344
U.S. 206 (1952); Parker v. Illinois, 333 US. 571 (1948); Hart & Wechsler 1593; Wright
493. But see Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970), where the Court held that the time
requirement imposed by Supreme Court Rule 22 was not jurisdictional, and therefore
could be waived by the Court. However, the opposite may be true for time limits em-
bodied in statutes. Id. at 68 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan also noted that dis-
cretionary waiving of time limits should be employed sparingly. Id. at 69 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). In any event, time limits will often prevent a case from being considered by
the Court (e.g., United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106 (1848), discussed in note
93 supra).
95. E.g., R. Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court (1969); Hart & Wechsler 311-16,
330-65; Wright 22-23; Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, in Hart & Wechsler 330-60 (an earlier version appeared in
66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953)) [hereinafter cited as Hart Article]; Lenoir; Levy, Congres-
sional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: A Reappraisal, 22
N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 178 (1967); Martig, Congress and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 650 (1936); Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's
Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 53 (1962); Ratner, Congres-
sional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157
(1960); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001 (1965);
Limitations on Jurisdiction. See also Note, The Nixon Busing Bills and Congressional Power,
81 Yale L.J. 1542 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Busing Bills], which presents the issue in
terms of the acts proposed by President Nixon to undercut the Supreme Court's busing
mandate announced in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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The United States Constitution reads in pertinent part:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish....
.... In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Juris-
diction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 0
The first question presented by this seemingly straight-forward language was
whether the Supreme Court had any appellate jurisdiction without express
statutory authorization from CongressY However, this question was soon
rendered moot by the passage of the First Judiciary Act 8 which did in fact
vest certain judicial powers and jurisdiction in the Supreme Court and other
federal courts. The question then became, to what extent may Congress
delineate the high Court's appellate jurisdiction and it is in this form that the
question has remained throughout the years. D
Chief Justice John Marshall set the tone for all further discussion by declar-
ing that the First Judiciary Act "described" the Supreme Court's jurisdiction,
and, therefore, jurisdiction could only be exercised within the limitations imposed
by the Act.'0 0 In another case, he drew the boundaries more clearly by stating
that:
The appellate powers of this court are not given by the judicial act. They are given
by the constitution. But they are limited and regulated by the judicial act, and by
such other acts as have been passed on the subject. When the first legislature of the
Union proceeded to carry the third article of the constitution into effect, they must
be understood as intending to execute the power they possessed of making exceptions
to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. They have not, indeed, made these
exceptions in express terms. They have not declared, that the appellate power of the
court shall not extend to certain cases; but they have described affirmatively its
jurisdiction, and this affirmative description has been understood to imply a negative
on the exercise of such appellate power as is not comprehended within it.101
96. U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1-2.
97. Justice Story phrased the question this way: "[Wjhether the appellate jurisdiction
attaches to the Supreme Court, subject to be withdrawn and modified by Congress, or
whether an act of Congress is necessary to confer the jurisdiction upon the court." 2 J.
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 555 (5th ed. 1891). See
Martig, supra note 95, at 656-57; cf. Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796):
"If congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appel-
late jurisdiction . . . ." Id. at 327. See also Hart & Wechsler 313-15, for a discussion of
the related question of whether Congress is obliged to vest full jurisdiction in the federal
courts.
98. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
99. See generally the sources collected in note 95 supra.
100. United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 173 (1805).
101. Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810) (emphasis added),
For a discussion of the case see Limitations on Jurisdiction 100.
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One of Chief Justice Marshall's successors put the matter even more bluntly:
"By the constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court possesses no
appellate power in any case, unless conferred upon it by act of Congress; nor
can it, when conferred be exercised in any other form, or by any other mode of
proceeding than that which the law prescribes."' 0 2
Perhaps the most famous case standing for the proposition that Congress has
virtually absolute control over the Court's appellate jurisdiction is Ex parte
McCardle,103 called by one commentator the high-water mark 04 of congres-
sional power in this regard. McCardle, alleging unlawful restraint by military
force, 05 petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus; such writs were authorized
generally under an existing statute. 00 The writ was denied, and petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court. 07 After the Court had unanimously held that
102. Former Chief Justice Roger Taney in Barry v. Mercein, 46 US. (S How.) 103, 119
(1847). Other older cases to similar effect are Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.. (I Wall.)
243 (1863); McNulty v. Batty, 51 US. (10 How.) 72 (1850) (where the Court held that
the expiration of the act of Congress under which the lower court had taken jurisdiction
of the case also took away the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the appeal); see United
States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106 (1848); United States v. Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 108 (1812); Clarke v. Bazadone, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 212 (1803); Turner v. Bank
of N. America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799); The Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797);
Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796); Lenoir 26-27, 29. But see Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), wherein the Supreme Court extended its
appellate jurisdiction to certain decisions of the highest state courts. Justice Story said in
passing: "This leads us to the consideration of the great question, as to the nature and ex-
tent of the appellate jurisdiction of the United States. We have ... seen, that appellate juris-
diction is given by the constitution to the supreme court, in all cases where it has not
original jurisdiction; subject, however, to such exceptions and regulations as congress may
prescribe. . . . The judicial power is delegated by the constitution, in the most general
terms, and may, therefore, be exercised by congress, under every variety of form of appel-
late or original jurisdiction. And as there is nothing in the constitution which restrains or
limits this power, it must, therefore, in all other cases, subsist in the utmost latitude of
which, in its own nature, it is susceptible.... The appellate power is not limited by the
terms of the third article [of the Constitution] to any particular courts. The words are,
'the judicial power (which includes appellate power) shall extend to all cases,' &c., and 'in
all other cases before mentioned the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction." Id.
at 337-38 (emphasis omitted).
103. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). The case has been much discussed. See, e.g, Wright
22-23; Burton, Two Significant Decisions: Ex parte Milligan and Ex parte McCardle, 41
A.B.AJ. 121 (1955); Hart Article 330-31; Lenoir 31-35; Martig, supra note 95, at 661-69;
Busing Bills 1554-56.
104. Busing Bills 1554.
105. McCarde was not himself a member of the military, but was being held in military
custody for trial before a military commission. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 508. The earlier case
of Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 WalL) 2 (1866) intimated that the subjection of ordinary
citizens to military trials was indeed illegal.
106. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
107. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 508.
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it had jurisdiction of the appeal, 08 and after the case had been argued before
that Court, 00 Congress, apparently apprehensive that the Court would grant
McCardle's writ and thus invalidate much of the Reconstruction legislation,110
passed a statute"' which specifically repealed the part of the earlier statute'
1 2
that authorized appeals to the Supreme Court from the circuit courts. The
Court aquiesced, saying that Congress had the power to limit the Court's
jurisdiction in this way." 3
However, it may be possible to read McCardle too broadly. 1 4 It is impera-
tive to consider McCardle in its context. As one commentator has stated:
Few cases have aroused the Congress as much as McCardle, and few courts have
faced the intense pressure the Chase Court faced in deciding McCardle. With troops
in the streets of the capital and the President of the United States on trial before
the Senate, a less ideal setting for dispassionate judicial inquiry could hardly be
imagined." 5
One Supreme Court Justice has baldly stated: "There is a serious question
whether the McCardle case could command a majority view today.""10 In
addition, the case of Ex parte Yerger,117 which followed closely on the heels of
McCardle, reaffirmed the Court's jurisdiction of all habeas corpus appeals save
those which were the subject of repeal by the act of 1868;"1 that is, "the
repealing section of the act of 1868 is limited in terms, and must be limited in
108. Ex part McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867).
109. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 508.
110. Since McCardle was being held for trial by a military commission pursuant to
Reconstruction statutes, the Supreme Court's granting of his habeas writ would impiedly
invalidate those statutes. See Wright 22. The Court had previously refused to pass on the
validity of the Reconstruction Acts. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
111. Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44. The bill was passed over President
Andrew Johnson's veto. Berger, supra note 95, at 2.
112. See note 106 supra.
113. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 512-15. Subsequent cases with similar conclusions regarding
control of the Court's jurisdiction are Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957); Com-
missioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945); Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S.
423 (1943); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908); United States v.
Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 (1908); Colorado Cent. Consol. Mining Co. v. Turck, 150 U.S. 138
(1893); American Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K.W. Ry., 148 U.S. 372 (1893); Na-
tional Exch. Bank v. Peters, 144 U.S. 570 (1892); The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381
(1881); Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398 (1878); United States v. Young, 94 U.S. 258
(1876).
114. E.g., Wright 23; notes 115-121 infra and accompanying text.
115. Busing Bills 1555. To similar effect is Berger, who calls McCardle the Supreme
Court's "attempt to ride out the Reconstruction storm." Berger, supra note 95, at 3. For a
discussion of McCarde's facts "in the light of Reconstruction politics," see Martig, supra
note 95, at 661-65. See also Burton, supra note 103, at 176-77.
116. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.11 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
117. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
118. I.e., the act passed by Congress to extinguish the McCardle Court's jurisdiction.
See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
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effect to the appellate jurisdiction authorized by the act of 1867. '119 In view
of Verger, it is possible to read McCardle narrowly-that "[o]n the basis of
stare decisis . . the McCardle case does not stand for the proposition that
Congress has plenary control over the Court's appellate jurisdiction." 120 How-
ever, Verger may not be such a broad limitation on McCardle, since the Yerger
Court did not take issue with Congress' removal of jurisdiction in the earlier
case. That is, in reaffirming the Court's jurisdiction over all habeas corpus
appeals except those repealed by the McCardle statute, Verger implicitly re-
cognized Congress' power to repeal jurisdiction as was done in McCardle;
habeas corpus remained in non-McCardle areas because Congress had not
repealed them.121
Further, there is some authority for the proposition that, McCardle and
Verger aside, Congress does not necessarily have absolute power over the
Court's jurisdiction. In United States v. Klein,ea the Court held unconstitu-
tional an act of Congress12 3 which attempted to remove the Court's jurisdiction
over executive pardons. Klein was the administrator for one Wilson, who had
aided rebel forces during the Civil War but who had been pardoned by pres-
idential proclamation; this pardon was to have restored to Wilson all property
rights. Accordingly, Klein filed suit against the United States in the Court of
Claims for the proceeds of certain cotton which Wilson had owned and which
had been seized by treasury agents during the war. But Klein ran afoul of the
act of Congress 2 4 which mandated that no presidential pardon should be ad-
missible as evidence in support of any claim against the United States and
which additionally removed Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over any
case wherein the claimant had used such a pardon as evidence on his behalf.
In finding for Klein, the Court said: "We must think that Congress has in-
advertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power' 125 in attempting so to curtail jurisdiction. Thus, the case has been read
by some commentators to imply that there is in fact a limit to Congress' con-
trol over the Court's appellate jurisdiction and that the Court has the power
119. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 106. The same limitation of AcCardle to its spedfic facts
was mentioned in passing by the McCarde Court itself: "Counsel seem to have supposed,
if effect be given to the repealing act in question, that the whole appellate power of the
court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied. But this is an error. The act of 1868 does not
except from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of
1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised." 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
at 515 (footnote omitted).
120. Limitations on Jurisdiction 108 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See Wright 23;
Busing Bills 1555.
121. See Burton, supra note 103, at 176-77.
122. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). The case is discussed in Hart & Wechsler 315-16;
Lenoir 39-41; Busing Bills 1556-57.
123. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230. The relevant provisions were tacked on
to an appropriations bill.
124. Id.
125. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
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to ignore congressional acts which improperly deny jurisdiction. 120 However, a
less sweeping interpretation of the case is also possible. The Klein Court itself
qualified its holding because of the nature of the particular statute it held void:
If [the statute] simply denied the right of appeal in a particular class of cases, there
could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise of the power of Congress
to make "such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction" as should seem to it expe-
dient.
But the language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend to withhold
appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. Its great and controlling purpose
is to deny to pardons granted by the President the effect which this court had adjudged
them to have.'2 r
Therefore, it seems possible that Klein in reality dealt more specifically with
the validity and effect of executive pardons than with speculative limitations
on Congress' control of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Elsewhere it has been said that the Supreme Court has inherent power to
control the workings of the federal judiciary and, therefore, any attempt to
curtail its jurisdiction in this regard would be void. In United States v. Coe128
the Court said that "the judicial action of all inferior courts established by
Congress may, in accordance with the Constitution, be subjected to the appel-
late jurisdiction of the supreme judicial tribunal of the government."' 29 Sim-
ilarly, in Rosenberg v. United States'"0 the Court said, in passing, that "[t] his
Court has the responsibility to supervise the administration of criminal justice
by the federal judiciary."'1' These cases in no way involve congressional
attempts to limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, but they remain authority
for the Court's power to exercise appellate jurisdiction over inferior federal
courts, whether or not a conflicting statute exists.
It may also be noted that some cases which, on their face, seem to support
the view that Congress has absolute control over the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion, can be interpreted to mean that such jurisdiction actually issues from the
Constitution, with Congress only providing the needed authorization. For
example, in Daniels v. Railroad Co.,132 the Court stated that there are two
prerequisites to its appellate jurisdiction: "[T]he Constitution must give the
capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must supply the requisite author-
ity." 33 This may seem firm authority for the necessity of congressional autho-
126. See, e.g., Lenoir 41; Busing Bills 1557.
127. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145. The Court had previously upheld the effectiveness of
presidential pardons in United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).
128. 155 U.S. 76 (1894). The case discussed whether an appeal would lie to the Supreme
Court from a decision of the Court of Private Land Claims (established by the Act of Mar.
3, 1891, ch. 539, 26 Stat. 854), in a case concerning property located in United States
territories. 155 U.S. at 84-86.
129. 155 U.S. at 86.
130. 346 U.S. 273 (1953), involving a plea for a stay of execution.
131. Id. at 287.
132. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250 (1865).
133. Id. at 254 (footnote omitted). The Court continued: "The original jurisdiction of
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rization of appellate jurisdiction, but conversely, it can be read to imply that,
as regards the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, "congressional power is limited in
scope and subsequent or secondary in character.... [T]he Supreme Court has
substantial and essential appellate jurisdiction." 3 4
Finally, it is apparent that many recent commentators favor a narrow read-
ing of Congress' article III power over the Court and thus may be inclined to
question the validity of a National Court of Appeals which would usurp much
of the Court's jurisdiction.13 5 Some commentators qualify Congress' control
over jurisdiction by insisting that it cannot be used to impair the Court's
"essential constitutional functions" and claiming that no case has ever held
otherwise; 136 that Congress cannot limit the Court's jurisdiction if such will
affect constitutional rights; 13 7 or, that Congress may not be able to abolish the
Court's appellate jurisdiction in certain specific cases. 138
Others point out that, for historical reasons, congressional power over Supreme
Court jurisdiction is to be limited, for example, to the treatment of fact
issues.139 For what it is worth, one can also consider the comments of historical
this court, and its power to receive appellate jurisdiction, are created and defined by the
Constitution; and the legislative department of the government can enlarge neither one nor
the other. But it is for Congress to determine how far, within the limits of the capacity of
this court to take, appellate jurisdiction shall be given, and when conferred, it can be exercised
only to the extent and in the manner prescribed by law. In these respects it is wholly the
creature of legislation." Id. (footnote omitted).
134. Merry, supra note 95, at 54-55 n.6 (emphasis added).
135. However, it should be noted that at least some of these commentators may have
been influenced by certain specific attacks on the Court's appellate jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, Ratner, supra note 95, dealt specifically with the Jenner bill (discussed at notes
145-46 infra and accompanying text), and his dislike of that measure could conceivably
have led to his more general language about the limitations of congressional power over
appellate jurisdiction. Similarly, the Busing Bills article considered the question of control
of appellate jurisdiction in the context of the proposed "NLon Busing Bills" (as mentioned
in note 95 supra), and therefore it might have been influenced by them to champion the
Court's inherent jurisdiction to decide cases concerning rights.
136. Ratner, supra note 95, at 173, 201-02.
137. Hart Article 336-37. "[Tlhe power to regulate jurisdiction is subject ... in whole not
in part ... to the other provisions of the Constitution." Id. at 337; Busing Bills 1558,
1572. See also Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948), which held that Congress' power over the jurisdiction of inferior federal
courts cannot be used to abrogate fifth amendment rights.
138. See Limitations on Jurisdiction 113-15, wherein the commentator makes two pro-
posals: (1) when circuit courts are in conflict in cases involving "the constitutionality of
a law, the existence of a constitutional right, or the interpretation of a statute." Id. at
115. Note that the proposed national court would be specifically empowered to hear and
decide cases of conflict between the circuits. See notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text;
(2) when the lower federal courts are unable "to protect federal rights, whether consti-
tutional or statutory, from state action by way of collateral relief" (eg, the issuance of
writs of habeas corpus). Limitations on Jurisdiction at 115. This would seem to be a rare
occurrence.
139. E.g., Merry, supra note 95, at 68-69.
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figures who have concluded that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is not much
limited by Congress' article III power. 140 It should be pointed out, however,
that there are at least a few commentators who feel that Congress' power over
the Court's jurisdiction is extensive, if not absolute. One writes:
There is, to be sure, a school of thought that argues that "exceptions" has a narrow
meaning . . . . I see no basis for this view and think it antithetical to the plan of
the Constitution for the courts-which was quite simply that the Congress would
decide from time to time how far the federal judicial institution should be used
within the limits of the federal judicial power .... 141
Although concluding that "[t]he difficulty with legislative withdrawal of juris-
diction is not one of constitutional dimension,"' 42 this same authority postulates
certain "practical objections" to complete withdrawal. 148 Some of these objec-
tions-for example, the fact that courts are needed to enforce coercive sanctions
in society, or the fact that withdrawal of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
would leave issues to final resolution in the lower courts which could reach
contrary conclusions in different sectors of the country-would present no
problems under the proposed National Court of Appeals. Other objections-for
Berger, supra note 95, at 286-89 is similar in his explanation of the origins of article III.
Berger also notes that, speaking historically, it is illogical to think that the drafters of the
Constitution would intentionally give Congress complete control of the Court's jurisdiction:
"Once the legitimacy of judicial review and its central role in the Constitutional scheme are
granted, the power of Congress to make 'exceptions' to the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction cannot properly be given unlimited scope. There is no indication whatever that the
Founders conceived the 'exceptions' clause as a check on the Court's Constitutional deci-
sions. It seems hardly reasonable to conclude that they designed an effective curb on Con-
gressional excesses [in the form of judicial review] and simultaneously furnished Congress
with an easy means of circumventing it. To attribute that dual intention to the Founders
is to charge them with chasing their tails around a stump. So far as can be gathered from
the intensive discussions of the 'exceptions' clause in the Ratification conventions, its
purpose was narrow and altogether unrelated to a power to deprive the Court of jurisdic-
tion of Constitutional claims." Id. at 336-37.
140. For example, John Tyler, a member of the Virginia convention to ratify the Con-
stitution, could not see any limitation or restriction on the federal judicial power. Berger,
supra note 95, at 290 (citing 3 J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on
the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 638-39 (2d ed. 1881)). President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, when considering how best to make the Supreme Court amenable to his legis-
lative program, chose the infamous court-packing plan only because there seemed to be no
better alternative; presumably, President Roosevelt (and his behind-the-scenes adviser, then
Professor Felix Frankfurter) did not recognize the existence of any simpler method, con-
sistent with article III, to limit the Court's jurisdiction. Berger, supra note 95, at 291-92.
It is interesting to note that Martig wrote in response to the Court's abrogation, in Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), of the National Industrial Recovery
Act (Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195). Martig specifically proposed that the New
Dealers could avoid similar decisions by using article III to curb the Court's jurisdiction to
decide that sort of case. Martig, supra note 95, at 654.
141. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1005 (1965).
142. Id. at 1006.
143. Id.
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example, the fact that the Supreme Court, if its jurisdiction were withdrawn,
would no longer be able to reverse or explain its earlier holdings-could prove
troublesome if the national court were established, since it would be difficult, at
least initially, to establish the effect on past decisions and the precedence value
of denial of review by the national court.
But despite the existence of rational objections to congressional withdrawal
of jurisdiction, such withdrawal has often been proposed in Congress, although
usually without success.14 An examination of some of the more prominent
attempts to restrict jurisdiction will reveal them to be, for the most part,
irritated reactions to specific Court decisions, and therefore distinguishable from
the national court proposal. For example, the Jenner bill,145 an attempt to take
away the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review cases dealing with state or
congressional "control" of subversive activities, "was responsive to numerous
Supreme Court cases of the mid-fifties invalidating or limiting federal and state
programs aimed at alleged subversives ." 40 Similarly, the Tuck bill' 47 would
have denied the Supreme Court the right to review reapportionment cases, and
was a response to recent Court decisions that had invalidated state legislative
apportionments.14 Certain portions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets bill, 149 proposing to revoke the Supreme Court's 1 0 jurisdiction to review
the admissibility of admissions or confessions in criminal cases, were an attempt
to reverse United States v. Wade.'5 ' The provisions in question never became
law.'5 2
144. "In the fifteen years between 1953 and 1968, over sixty bills were introduced in
Congress to eliminate the jurisdiction of the federal courts over a variety of specific sub-
jects; none of these became law." Hart & Wechsler 360. See generally W. Murphy, Congress
and the Court (1962); Elliott, Court-Curbing Proposals in Congress, 33 Notre Dame Law.
597 (1958); Fite & Rubinstein, Curbing the Supreme Court-State Experiences and Federal
Proposals, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 762 (1937); Hufstedler, supra note 5, at 842-45; Nagel,
Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 925 (1965); Warren, Legisla-
tive and judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States-A History of the
Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 Am. L. Rev. 1 (1913).
145. S. 2646, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), discussed at Hart & Wechsler 360-61. For a
legislative history of the unsuccessful bill, see Hart & Wechsler 361 n.2. It was the Jenner
bill that Ratner had in mind when he stated that "legislation that precludes Supreme
Court review in every case involving a particular subject is an unconstitutional encroach-
ment." Ratner, supra note 95, at 201-02.
146. Hart & Wechsler 360 (footnote omitted). For a collection of cases wherein the
Supreme Court attacked antisubversive programs, see id. n.l.
147. H.R. 11926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See Hart & Wechsler 361. This bill passed
the House but was rejected in the Senate. Id.
148. Hart & Wechsler 361. The Tuck bill was only one of several bills designed to
eliminate the Court's jurisdiction over reapportionment cases. Id. n.3. See generally McKay,
Court, Congress, and Reapportionment, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 255 (1964).
149. S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); see Hart & Wechsler 361-62.
150. The proposed bill was to apply to inferior federal courts as well. Hart & Wechsler
361-62.
151. 388 US. 218 (1967); Hart & Wechsler 362 n.4.
152. See Hart & Wechsler 362 n.5 for a legislative history.
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On balance, then, it would seem as though the question of power over the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction would have to be settled in favor of a
National Court of Appeals; there is ample authority to suggest that Congress
can control the Court's jurisdiction by statute, at least where no contravention
of constitutional rights is involved. And, as noted above, the national court
would not abrogate any right to appeal to the Supreme Court, for in fact no
constitutional right exists.153
But there is one final point about appellate jurisdiction. As Hart has pointed
out in discussing remedies, 5 4 it is very rarely an abrogation of a constitutional
right for Congress to substitute one remedy for another, or to take one away
while leaving open another.1' 5 By analogy, then, it would seem that Congress
may take away avenues of approach to the Supreme Court, if it simultaneously
substitutes a new judicial layer with virtually final power to consider appeals.
However, such a substitution could easily run afoul of the constitutional re-
quirement of only "one supreme Court." The dilemma is partly resolved by
reserving to the Supreme Court the power to "reach down" for any case it
wishes to review; 15 6 but as a practical matter this power could be insignificant
since the Supreme Court conceivably at times might be unaware of specific
cases in lower courts, or might routinely defer judgment to the national
court.
15 7
But beyond this, it is difficult to predict whether the national court would
transgress the constitutional requirement of "one supreme Court," precisely
because that requirement has never itself been challenged or examined before.
To be sure, a measure like the Evarts Act'5 8 interposed an additional judicial
layer between trial courts and the Supreme Court, but it in no way precluded
an unsuccessful claimant in the newly-created circuit courts of appeals from
having a petition for further review read and considered by the Supreme Court
itself. By contrast, a litigant whose claim were to be rejected by the proposed
153. See notes 89-94 supra and accompanying text.
154. Hart Article 332.
155. See also Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899), where the Court
stated: "And while it is undoubtedly true that legislatures cannot set aside the judgments of
courts, compel them to grant new trials, order the discharge of offenders, or direct what
steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry, the grant of a new remedy by
way of review has taken often sustained under particular circumstances." Id. at 478 (citations
omitted).
156. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
157. See also Wall St. J., supra note 69. In addition, allowing the Supreme Court to
"reach down" below the national court for cases it wished to hear could conceivably
encourage an attorney to file two sets of papers, one in the national court, and the other
in the Supreme Court, in hope of inducing the high Court to "reach down" for his par-
ticular case. The result would be twice as much paperwork for the courts, instead of less.
Similar reasoning was formulated by Prof. Alan Dershowitz in arguing against the proposed
national court on "The Advocates-Should We Create a National Court of Appeals To
Ease the Burden on the Supreme Court?," broadcast by WNET/NY on February 9, 1973,
in the unofficial transcript at 12.
158. See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
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national court could not then obtain relief from the Supreme Court, except in
the rare instance where the Court would be willing to "reach down" for the
case, in the face of the national court's rejection. Therefore, there are no his-
torical parallels exactly on point, and one is left with the bare constitutional
language that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court .... "'59 Former Chief Justice Hughes, in discussing the
related topic of whether the Supreme Court could be split into divisions, chose
to interpret the constitutional language literally: "The Constitution does not
appear to authorize two or more Supreme Courts or two or more parts of a
supreme court functioning in effect as separate courts."1 10  Similarly, the
Federalist Papers merely recognized the constitutional exclusivity of the
Supreme Court without further comment: "That there ought to be one court
of supreme and final jurisdiction, is a proposition which is not likely to be con-
tested. The reasons for it . ..are too obvious to need repetition.",'
In sum, if the national court proposal is to run into any constitutional
difficulties, it is here that the conflict will arise, on the question of whether the
"one supreme Court" mandated by the Constitution may divorce from its
function of review the function of deciding which cases to review. 0 2
III. CoNcLusIoN
It should be clear from the foregoing that the proposal for a National Court
of Appeals is radically innovative, somewhat akin to earlier remedies like the
Evarts Act, but going much further toward actually limiting the traditional
functions, if not the essence, of the Supreme Court. Its constitutionality is open
to question, since its broad power to deny further review endangers the "one
supreme Court" of the Constitution, but it would appear to be constitutional
for Congress to control the federal judiciary in this way. Whether or not it is
a good idea, or a necessary one at this point in time, is a different question.
Certainly the massive outpouring of learned criticism of the national court,
much of it from present justices and judges, must give one pause, even though
some of this criticism may merely represent the inertia of the system under the
impact of this radical proposal. Still, it is necessary to weigh seriously the ad-
visability of creating at this time a whole new court, a completely distinct
judicial layer, with its concomitant bureaucracy and expense. Such an insti-
159. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
160. Chief Justice Hughes' letter, S. Rep. No. 711, supra note 23, at 40, in Hart &
Wechsler 43 n.58, 44. See also the criticism of the national court on this point by former
Justice Goldberg, at notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
161. The Federalist No. 81, at 369 (Hallowell ed. 1857) (A. Hamilton).
162. Of course, the constitutionality of any actual national court will ultimately be
decided by the Supreme Court itself, in the inevitable case in which the national court is
challenged on constitutional grounds. Therefore it is interesting to attempt to predict how
the current Justices may decide such a case by examining their opinions about the pro-
posed court. See, e.g., notes 79 and 87 supra and accompanying text. Too, it should be
remembered that the present Chief Justice himself established the Study Group which
drafted the proposal for a national court. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
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tution, once in existence, would become as entrenched and self-perpetuating
as any other governmental organ, and thus its creation should not be under-
taken without serious reflection.
Hesitancy about the proposed court becomes all the more material when one
considers the number of people, including present Supreme Court justices, who
feel that the Court is not now so overburdened as to be precluded from effec-
tive performance of its tasks,163 ominous statistical evidence notwithstanding.
If the Supreme Court is in fact capable of carrying out its functions, or is
nearly so, it would seem superfluous to create a full-fledged new national court,
at least until other less extreme remedial measures'" are tried. As Harvard
Professor Alan Dershowitz has said, perhaps it would be best to try the
"aspirin" first, before engaging in the "radical surgery." 0 5
Justice Potter Stewart's middle-of-the-road approach is similar. Having first
noted that the Supreme Court's caseload is, at present, not intolerable, and
therefore, that the national court is currently not needed, he did acknowledge
that if the caseload "'should continue to increase at this rate, perhaps 10 years
from now the situation would be different.' ,106 This approach seems the most
sensible. While something should be done now to alleviate the voluminous in-
flow of petitions to the Supreme Court, there is little reason to start with the
most extreme measure first. Less sweeping remedies should be tried, and, if
they fail to provide needed relief, the national court concept could be resur-
rected at some future date.
One of the main difficulties with the national court-overshadowing all pre-
dictions as to its constitutionality and desirability-is its utter uniqueness.
This nation has created new federal courts before, but never one with the
power to impinge so greatly on the functions of the Supreme Court. It is a
radical measure, best reserved for a more radical crisis.
163. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
164. E.g., the elimination of three-judge district courts and the accompanying direct
review of their decisions by the Supreme Court. For other like proposals of the Study
Group, see text accompanying notes 5-6 supra. For other proposals from various sources,
see note 88 supra.
165. Unofficial transcript from "The Advocates," supra note 157, at 10.
166. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1973, § 4, at 6, col. 2.
